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RECENT DECISIONS

Non-experts may, after describing the wound, give an opinion that the wound
caused death, not in answer to a hypothetical question but as a conclusion of
fact based on their observations. Tanner v. State, 163 Ga. 121, 135 S.E. 917
(1926); Fudge v. State, 9 S.E. (2d) 259 (Ga. 1940) ; Johnson v. State, 80 Fla.
61, 85 So. 155 (1920). Where the evidence of medical experts is not accessible,
a non-medic's testimony is sufficient to sustain a conviction where the witness
describes the wounds he examined and gives his opinion, with reasons, that the
wounds caused death. Edwards v. State, 39 Fla. 753, 23 So. 537 (1897) ; Revels
v. State, 64 Fla. 432, 59 So. 951 (1912) ; Cecil v. State, 100 S.W. 390 (Tex. Cr.
App. 1907). A physician licensed to practice medicine, but not being a graduate
of a medical school and it appearing that he was not familiar with surgery
from reading nor with gunshot wounds from experience, was not permitted to
testify in answer to hypothetical questions as to the cause of death to the deceased whose body he had not examined. Smith v. State, 99 S.W. 100 (Tex. Cr.
App. 1907).
While a non-medical witness was erroneously permitted to testify that there
had been no cases of a particular disease in the neighborhood, since he was
not shown to have had any knowledge of the sickness in question, he could testify whether or not there had been any disease at all. The court stated that since
there are as many grades of knowledge in the professions as out of them, the
only safe method is to permit the witness to speak within the range of his ascertained qualifications. Evans v. People, 12 Mich. 27 (1863). A medical student
who was present while a doctor made a physical examination may testify that the
person was afflicted with a venereal disease, where the student had studied and
practiced under the doctor- and had treated not less than fifty cases of the
disease. State v. Dixon, 47 La. 1, 16 So. 589 (1895). In a prosecution for abortion, a witness who was a student interne in an obstetrical ward when she
made an examination of the deceased prior to receiving her license to practice,
was permitted to testify as an expert having received her license by the time
of trial. People v. Heissler,338 Ill.
596, 170 N.E. 685 (1930).
In Wisconsin it does not appear that there has been a decision to the effect
that non-medics are not permitted to testify as experts on physical or mental
conditions, but the cases indicate that all expert testimony in such matters has
been presented, in criminal actions, by licensed physicians and surgeons only.
Tendrup v. State, 193 Wis. 482, 214 N.W. 356 (1927) ; Lowe v. State, 118 Wis.
641, 96 N.W. 417 (1903).
PHnaP W. GRO:SmAN, Ja.

Insurance-Use of Automobile as "Public Conveyance for Compensation.'The defendant insurance company insured the plaintiff against damage to his
automobile, but the policy was to be void if the automobile was "used as a public or livery conveyance for carrying passengers for compensation." The plaintiff used the car in going to and from school, and carried other students who
voluntarily paid him 75 cents per week. Held, that the contributions of 75 cents
per week, being voluntary, did not make the car a "public or livery conveyance
for compensation" such as was described in the policy. Wood v. Merchants'
Insurance Co. of Providence, 289 N.W. 259 (Mich. 1939).
To be a public conveyance the vehicle must be operated as either a private
contract-carrier or as a common carrier. Primrose v. Casualty Co. of America,
232 Pa. 230, 81 Atl. 212 (1911); Anderson v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 170 N.Y.
Supp. 431, 183 App. Div. 170 (1918). Since the plaintiff in the principal case did
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not hold himself out as ready to carry all who requested transportation he was

not operating a common carrier. Brown v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. of
Calif., 8 F. (2d) 996 (C.C.A. 5th, 1925). And since the contributions were voluntary he was not under a contractual duty to the passengers and therefore was
not a private carrier. Marks et al. v. Home Fire and Marine Insurance Co. of
Calif., 285 Fed. 959 (App. D.C. 1923).
The question whether he was carrying for hire or compensation offers more
difficulty. In deciding whether the Board of Railroad Commissioners had jurisdiction over a motor vehicle as being operated for hire, the words "for hire"
were held to mean "for remuneration of any kind, paid or promised, either
directly or indirectly." Murphy et al v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, 49 S.D.
197, 207 N.W. 92 (1926). When the owner of the car himself contributed his
proportionate share of the gas, oil, and garage expenses for a trip, it has been
held that there was not a carrying for hire or compensation so as to make the
driver exercise a higher degree of care. Askowith v. Massel, 250 Mass. 202, 156
N.E. 875 (1927). Requiring the passenger to pay the cost of the gas and oil
used on a trip has been held not a carrying for hire. Armistead v. Lenkeit, 230
Ala. 155, 160 So. 257 (1935). But where students agreed to pay the amount of
gas and oil used on a trip plus a small sum to the driver for the use of the
car, it was held a carrying for hire within the provisions of defendant's insurance policy because of the slight sum given in addition to the cost of the gas and
oil. Gross et al. v. Kubel, 315 Pa. 396, 172 Atl. 649 (1934).
Where plaintiff's car was used for hire on two or three occasions to carry
passengers to fair grounds during a county fair, it was not such a carrying for
hire as would enable an insurance company to avoid liability on its policy, the
court holding that in order to make a carrying for hire or compensation result
in a foreiture of the policy it must be shown that the automobile was used continuously for that purpose, or that the owner made a business of it. Comnercial Union Assurance Co. of London v. Hill, 167 S.W. 1095 (Texas, 1914). If
there is a carrying for hire it makes no difference that the compensation was
never in fact paid. Thus, where the plaintiff made an agreement to carry for a
certain sum and the passenger stole the car, recovery for the value of the car
was refused by the court since the car was being used in violation of the provisions of the policy. Mittet et al. v. Home Insurance Co., 49 S.D. 319, 207 N.W.

49 (1926).
ROBERT P. HAMM.

Workmen's Compensation-Accident Distinguished from Occupational Disease.-The plaintiff operated for one day a motor truck which emitted exces-

sive quantities of fumes. These were inhaled by the plaintiff, who contracted
pneumonia as a result. Held, that pneumonia thus acquired was not an injury
by "accident" within the New Mexico Workmen's Compensation Act, since the
victim was "conscious of no mishap, hazard, or-misadventure." Stevenson v.
Lee Moor Contracting Co., 9 U.S.L. WEEK 2242 (N.Mex. Sup. Ct., Sept. 21,
1940).
The subjection of an employee to extraordinary strain, or unusual conditions
and definite as to time and place, causing injury, is an "accidental" injury,
under the compensation acts. Esmonde v. Lima Locomotive Works, 51 Ohio App.
454, 1 N.E. (2d) 633 (1937). Where the disability results from continual breathing of iron dust, and the employee can point to no particular occurrence or time

